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NOTES 697 
OIL AND GAS-EFFECT OF ENTIRETY CLAUSES ON 
GRANTEES TAKING UNDER DEEDS SUBJECT TO LEASE 
Often the owner of land places it under an oil lease, and 
later conveys fee interests or mineral or royalty interests in segre-
gated tracts from the leased area. When oil is subsequently pro-
duced on some, but not all of the leased area, problems may arise 
as to the royalty rights of the lessor and the grantees. Specific-
ally, is the right of each grantee to royalties modified by the fact 
that his tract is part of a larger leased area? The problem will 
be considered in the absence and in the presence of the contractual 
device known as the entirety clause.1 
Various types of conveyances may give rise to this problem: 
conveyance of an interest in the fee; conveyance of an interest in 
the minerals under the land; or conveyance of an interest in 
royalties. Unless otherwise indicated, "conveyance" henceforth 
in this note will ref er to conveyance of interest in the minerals. 
1 An entirety clause provides that if portions of the leased tract come 
into separate ownerships, the royalties shall be paid to the separate 
owners in the proportion that the acreage owned by each bears to the 
entire acreage. 
698 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 
The weight of authority holds that the grantee of a tract 
from a parcel of land held under an oil lease is entitled to all the 
royalties produced from his tract, and to none of the royalties 
from any other tract covered by the lease. The rationale is that 
the grantee bought only the royalties from one tract and his rights 
are not affected by the fact that other tracts are under the same 
oil lease.2 
The rule seems logical enough on its face, but sometimes it 
produces quite harsh results. Consider the Oklahoma case of 
Galt v. Metscher.3 There it was held that the lessee had a right 
to develop the land as a unit and the purchaser of the south 80 
of a 160 acre tract had no interest in a well drilled on the north 
80-even though the well was just four feet from the dividing 
line. Probably much of the oil in which the owner of the south 
80 was adjudged to have no interest was taken from underneath 
his land. 
It may be argued that such result is not inequitable, since 
the grantee gambled that the well would be drilled on his tract, 
in which case he would take all. A rule which imposes such an 
all-or-nothing prospect upon a purchaser, however, serves to rend-
er an inherently speculative field even more speculative. Further-
more many courts have felt that an undue hardship is worked on 
a grantee who can receive no compensation for oil taken from 
underneath his land through a well on the same lease.4 
Of course a decision adopting this result may have the ef-
fect of mitigating the hardship in case of deeds executed subse-
quent to the decision, since the parties can adjust the price in 
view of the decision. The element of increased speculativeness 
would still be present, however. 
Galt v. Metscher5 said in effect that the parties could remedy 
:! Cases holding the sans clause, grantee takes all from his tract and 
only from his tract: Central Pipe Line Co. v. Hutson, 401 Ill. 447, 
82 N.E.2d 624 (1948); Carlock v. Krug, 151 Kan. 407, 99 P.2d 858 
(1940); Japhet v. McRae, 102 Tex. Cr. 310, 276 S.W. 669 (1925); 
Galt v. Metscher, 103 Okla. 271. 229 Pac. 522 (1924); Kimbley v. Luckey, 
72 Okla. 217, 179 Pac. 928 (1919); Osborn v. Ark. Territorial Oil & 
Gas Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122 (1912); Northwestern Ohio Natural 
Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68 Ohio St. 259, 67 N.E. 494 (1903). Contra: Cook 
v. Cook's Adm'r, 261 Ky. 501, 88 S.W.2d 27 (1935); Wettengel v. 
Gormley, 160 Pa. 559, 28 Atl. 934 (1894). 
3103 Okla. 271, 229 Pac. 522 (1924). 
4 Thomas Gilcrease Foundation v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co .. 266 S.W.2d 
850 (Tex. 1954); Galt v. Metscher, 103 Okla. 271, 229 Pac. 522 (1924). 
r. 103 Okla. 271, 229 Pac. 522, 524 0924). 
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the situation by contract. There are numerous devices, which, 
while conceived to solve various problems of oil and gas produc-
tion, have some bearing on the instant problem. These include 
the joint or community lease, the lease pooling clause, separate 
pooling agreements, and equitable pooling.6 This note, however, 
is concerned solely with the device known as the entirety clause. 
An entirety clause in an oil lease provides that if the leased 
land passes into separate ownership, the premises shall neverthe-
less be developed as an entirety and all royalties accruing under the 
lease shall be divided among the separate owners in the propor-
tion that the land of each bears to the entire leased acreage. A 
typical clause reads as follows : 
If the leased premises shall hereafter be owned severally or in 
separate tracts, the premises nevertheless shall be developed and 
operated as one lease and all royalties accruing hereunder shall 
be treated as an entirety and shall be divided among and paid 
to such separate owners in the proportion that the acreage owned 
by each such separate owner bears to the entire leased acreage.7 
When mineral deeds which contain a provision making them 
subject to lease are later executed, an entirety clause will usually 
be enforced to result in pro rata sharing of the royalties by the 
owners of interests in the separate tracts.8 
Louisiana is the only state which has refused to enforce en-
tirety clauses. In a 1936 decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
enforced such a clause ;9 but the following year, the same court, 
without citing the previous case, refused enforcement.10 The 
latter case dealt with a deed assigning the royalties instead of a 
deed conveying the minerals, and the lease read "in proportions 
according to the acreage and/or interest owned by each" instead 
of the usual phrasing "in the proportion that the acreage owned 
by each bears to the entire leased acreage." The real rationale 
of the holding, however, was probably that the clause was in-
serted into the lease solely for the benefit of the lessee, who did 
fl Hoffman, Voluntary Pooling and Unitization (1954). 
7 Id. at 186. 
s Carter Oil Co. v. Crude Oil Co., 201 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1953); 
Thomas Gilcrease Foundation v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 266 S.W.2d 
850 (Tex. 1954); Harley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 378 Ill. 19, 37 
N.E.2d 760 (1941); Eason v. Rosamond, 173 Okla. 10, 46 P.2d 471 
(1935); Schrader v. Gypsy Oil Co., 38 N.I\I. 124, 28 P.2d 885 (1933); 
Gypsy Oil Co. v. Schonwald, 107 Okla. 253, 231 Pac. 864 (1924). 
9 Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., 
185 La. 751, 170 So. 785 (1936). 
IO Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Carter, 187 La. 382, 175 So. 1 (1937). 
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not assert that ignoring the entirety clause would increase his 
obligations or diminish his rights. 
The argument that entirety clauses are for the sole benefit 
of the lessee is seriously weakened by the fact that far less drastic 
provisions will protect the lessee just as fully. At least one pres-
ent day lease contains a provision that if a certain number of 
persons become interested in the royalty, the lessee shall not be 
required to make payment until the interested persons have desig-
nated in writing some agent to receive payment for all ;11 or that 
regardless of division of ownership, the lessee shall not be re-
quired to measure separately the production from any segregated 
tract or to protect any segregated tract against inside drainage.12 
One recent Oklahoma case may be thought to stand for re-
jection of entirety clauses, but actually the court only refused to 
apply a clause to an unusual fact situation.13 The deed conveyed 
the minerals in a specifically designated tract for the duration of 
the existing lease. The court reasoned that the specific tract 
designations, if accorded any meaning at all, would have to be 
applicable to the lease period. The court distinguished this situa-
tion from the other Oklahoma cases enforcing entirety clauses14 
by noting that in those cases the entirety clause could be applied 
dul'ing the life of the lease, and the specific tract designation 
thereafter. 
The above case does raise a problem, however, in that it 
seems to condition enforcement of the clause upon the provision 
of the mineral deed. There is language in some cases to the ef-
fect that the clause so binds the lessor that he cannot make any 
subsequent inconsistent disposal of the land or mineral rights.10 
If strictly applied, such interpretation of the effect of the clause 
would presumably render the clause binding even upon grantees 
whose deeds do not contain any reference to a lease. Such rigid 
application of the clause might seem unjust when there is only 
one grantee, but might be necessary where there is more than 
one grantee to avert complex problems of the respective rights 
of grantees whose deeds are subject to lease, and those whose 
11 Producers 88, revised 1943, as printed in Kulp, Cases on Oil & Gas 
835, 842 (3d ed. 1947). 
12 Ibid. 
13 !skin v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 207 Okla. 615, 251 P.2d 
1073 (1952). 
H Eason v. Rosamond, 173 Okla. 10, 46 P.2d 471 (1935); Gypsy Oil 
Co. v. Schonwald, 107 Okla. 253, 231 Pac. 864 (1924). 
ir, Ibid. 
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deeds are not subject to lease. Where there are only two grantees, 
for example, refusal to enforce the clause in regard to one of 
the grantees would nullify it as to the other, unless the lessor 
could be forced to compensate the subject-to grantee for non-en-
forcement. Just how far jurisdictions which enforce entirety 
clauses will allow the clauses to be modified by the terms of 
mineral deeds is a question which awaits further judicial clarifi-
cation. 
An Illinois case has been cited as limiting the effect of en-
tirety clauses by implying that the clauses would not be enforced 
where proper ground for reformation of the mineral deed existed.111 
Actually the case does not greatly curtail the usefulness of the 
clauses. The grantor and grantee signed a deed subject to a lease 
with neither of them knowing that the lease contained an en-
tirety clause. After oil was produced on the grantees' land, they 
sought reformation of the deed on the ground of mutual mistake 
of fact. The court denied reformation, stating that when parties 
sign a deed which they know to be subject to a lease, the terms of 
which they are consciously ignorant, they manifestly conclude 
that those terms would not induce them to refrain from entering 
into the agreement. This statement may be only dictum, since 
one grantee's attorney had a copy of the lease before signing the 
deed and the other grantee learned of the clause (and dismissed 
it as unimportant) after signing but before oil production.17 Even 
in the absence of these last two factors, however, the result is in 
accord with Nebraska and general contract law.18 Thus parties 
who sign deeds made subject to a lease cannot get reformation 
later on the ground that they did not know of the presence of an 
entirety clause in the lease. 
Entirety clauses appear to be eminently enforceable in Ne-
braska. In a very recent case the Supreme Court of Nebraska 
enforced a clause even though the tracts involved were non-con-
tiguous and apparently not even in the same geological structure.w 
While other courts have enforced entirety clauses covering non-
contiguous tracts,20 there appears to be no other case in which an 
entirety clause was enforced on tracts not of the same geological 
structure. 
16 Harley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 378 Ill. 19, 37 N.E.2d 760 (1941 ). 
17 Id. at 766. 
is Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Suydam, 69 Neb. 407, 95 N.W. 867 
(1903); see 137 A.L.R. 900 (1941). 
19 Rauner v. Jones, 159 Neb. 385. 67 N.W.2d 347 (1954). 
20 Schrader v. Gypsy Oil Co., 38 N.III. 124, 28 P.2d 885, 888 (1933). 
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The holding is quite logical in terms of the statements of 
some of the cases that an entirety clause precludes a lessor from 
making any subsequent inconsistent conveyance. If the clause is 
viewed as a covenant running with the whole leased area, such 
factors as structural differences become irrelevant. If the clause 
is viewed in terms of its purpose, however, the wisdom of its ap-
plication to tracts on different structures is· far less clear. The 
divestiture of oil from beneath a tract without compensation to 
the owner is the primary evil which entirety clauses seek to avert, 
but it is an evil which cannot occur in regard to tracts on dif-
ferent geological structures. Indeed, enforcement in such situa-
tions produces the same type inequity which the clauses seek to 
avert, in that it transfers royalties from the owner of an interest 
in producing land to the owner of an interest in another tract 
which could not have contributed to the production. 
There are factors, however, which militate for the enforce-
ment of the clauses even in such extreme situations. The owner 
of an interest in a segregated tract can be seriously harmed in 
ways other than by uncompensated drainage of his oil through 
other wells on the leased area. Since the lessee may usually con-
tinue to hold the lease as long as he produces from the leased area, 
the owner may never get oil production from his tract. Nor may 
he get delay payments from the lessee, since delay payments are 
excused by production anywhere within the leased area. These 
inequities may be mitigated somewhat by implied covenants on 
the part of the lessee to reasonably develop the entire leased area 
once production has been obtained from any part of the area. 
CONCLUSION 
Enforcement of entirety clauses is desirable in precluding the 
uncompensated taking of oil from an owner of a tract in a leased 
area through drillings on other tracts in the area. It results in 
alleviation of hardship upon the owner of mineral interests and 
lessens the speculative element in the purchasing of such interests. 
When the tracts to which the clause is sought to be enforced are 
not on the same geological structure, however, the desirability of 
enforcement is less clear. If the clause is enforced, the owner of 
interests in a producing tract will be compelled to share royalties 
with the owner whose tract did not contribute to the production. 
If the clause is not enforced, a tract owner may be doomed to a 
long period of non-development of his tract, with no compensation 
for the delay. The equities favoring enforcement have apparently 
met with the favor of the Nebraska Supreme Court, and that 
court will enforce an entirety clause covering tracts not of the 
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same structure. In Nebraska, as elsewhere, the extent, if any, to 
which parties may alter the effect of the clause through subse-
quent provisions in deeds has not yet been decided. 
Allan J. Garfinkle, '56 
